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Summary 
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Purpose: Test the developments and predicaments of the ongoing health care reform 
in China with the new institutional economics (NIE) theories. 
Methodology: Introduce theoretical materials and literatures and relevant facts and 
practices to show how the facts reflect the theories and how improvements can be 
made in practice. And through a survey study to create a better understanding of the 
current situation of public health and the ongoing health care reform in China and 
come to conclusion and give some suggestions of improvement. The theory which 
supports analysis is the institutional change theory of the New Institutional 
Economics (NIE) theory which is defined as one of the three major theoretical 
foundations of the NPM theory. 
For Chapter 1, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, information searched was from books and 
websites. For Chapter 4, information was collected from a survey research of 4 
hospitals in Changchun City, Jilin Province, China. 
Theoretical perspectives: NIE theories raised by Ankarloo (2006) and North (1993). 
Empirical foundation: A survey on the NPM in hospitals in China theoretically 
based on North’s (1993) five proposals to define the essential characteristics of 
institutional change with both close questions and open questions, completed by 
management of some local hospitals in Changchun City, Jilin Province, China. 
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Conclusions: There are both attainments and problems in public hospitals in the 
ongoing healthcare reform in China. Even though the ongoing reform has achieved 
some concrete results, for example, public hospitals have developed their core 
competence in market competition and are making effort to maintain competitiveness; 
there are still maladies in public hospitals that of which some are generated from 
defective interactions, some appear to be aroused by stereotype and some can be 
ascribed to path-dependence. However, as for the reason that there is a lack of 
information from private and PPP hospitals, the situation of such hospitals remains 
unknown and may lead the study to inevitable partiality. 
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1. Preface 
1.1 Introduction 
1.1.1 General Situation 
The NPM is considered as an efficacious way to improve effectiveness and efficiency 
in management control of public health for its market-driven and market-driving 
characteristics. Theoretically, it is a hybrid of economics and business management in 
public management. Because of its advanced adaptability and flexibility, the NPM has 
been widely applied to many fields and yield results. In China’s health care reform, 
though still in an embryonic stage, the adoption of the NPM has shown an enormous 
potential in promoting resource utilization and remolding the role of the government. 
So far, as a corollary of global development of social wealth, medical technology, 
living standard and educational level, it has come to the fact that health care has been 
playing an ever-growing role in human lives. However, there are signs that the 
existing system fails to keep pace with the times and a reform in the area is imperative. 
Meanwhile, due to a series of problems rooting in either external or internal 
backgrounds in many countries, the reform in health care has been defined as a 
cosmopolitan conundrum which is a burning issue. In China, there seems to be more 
barriers for the issue to be dealt with since numerous factors such as unreasonable 
resource allocation, highly bureaucratic centralization, legal limbo, historical 
problems, blind spots in planning, population ageing and economic inequality, 
especially the rural-urban gap and the coastal-inland gap, have become profound 
reasons of skewed supply and demand, imbalance in the development of publicly and 
privately funded health care, cut-throat competition, and deterioration of 
physician-patient relationship. From the premise, having to confront increasing 
opportunities as well as booming challenges, the government/county 
councils/municipals are under pressure to trigger innovation of their public 
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management in health care. Following the principle of gradual improvement, to dispel 
the inelasticity and explore possibilities of new public management, it is prudent to 
catalyze a structural reform through carrying out a top-down functional reform which 
is consistent with China’s national conditions in health care. 
In the NPM, new institutional economics (NIE) is a major theoretical basis through 
which resolution to problems related to public choice theory in practice may be 
created. Ankarloo (2006) presented that theory of evolution has been carried forward 
and refined by NIE at the economic level while the concepts of markets, supply and 
demand, marginalism, factors of production etc. are carried on from neoclassical 
legitimacy. On this basis, he recited five basic concepts of NIE: bounded rationality, 
transaction costs, property rights, institutions, and the distinctiveness of NIE 
(Ankarloo D 2006). Within the ambit of NIE, the institutional change theory is always 
defined as a mainstay of theories of NIE and constituted by formal restrictions (e.g. 
law and other effective written articles), informal restrictions (e.g. norms, culture and 
religion) and the way they work in practice (North DC 1990). North (1993) listed five 
proposals to define the essential characteristics of institutional change. First, the 
continuous interaction of institutions and organizations in the economic setting of 
scarcity and hence competition is the key to institutional change. Second, rivalry 
compels organizations to keep investing in skills and knowledge to survive. Third, the 
institutional structure directs the types of skills and knowledge perceived to have the 
maximum pay-off. Fourth, perceptions are derived from the mental constructs of the 
players. Fifth, the economies of range, complementation, and network externalities of 
an institutional matrix make institutional change overwhelmingly incremental and 
path dependent (North DC 1993). In the literature review, the literature will laterally 
support Ankarloo’s theory. And in empirical analysis, the survey analysis will be on 
the basis of North’s theory. 
1.1.2 NPM in Developing Countries 
Polidano (1999) indicated that when it comes to the implementation of the NPM in 
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developing countries, major elements that restrict managerial ability include low pay 
levels and fragile systemization of managerial framework. He also pointed out that 
low pay can result in another common problem in the public sector in many 
developing countries - corruption. In his studies according to Crook and Manor (1998) 
and Smith (1998), at the local level, the overall situation of improvement of NPM 
skills is usually not better but even worse that that at the national level. It is also 
mentioned that according to Caiden (1991) and Kiggundu (1998), the failure rate of 
the NPM reforms in an managerial way in both developed countries and developing 
countries is rather high. In his conclusion, it is claimed that whether an NPM can be 
considered successful depends on the same foundational deciding factors recognized 
by researchers linking to previous generation reforms rather than a simple judgment 
of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ (Polidano C 1999). 
1.1.3 NPM in Healthcare Affected by National Culture 
Peyton (2009) claimed that Darwin’s famous theory of ‘survival of the fittest’ is also 
applicable to the implementation of NPM in healthcare, though maybe in a rather 
indirect way. On this perspective, it refers to the statement that the processes of 
implementation of NPM should be suitable and adaptable to the circumstance, 
especially with consideration of national culture. Comparison between 
implementation of NPM in Denmark and the U.S. was taken for example, since even 
though the culture is quite approximate in the two countries, the U.S. culture which 
emphasizing competition and identification makes performance measurement 
widespread, while Danish culture which emphasizing equality makes performance 
measurement not that popular although the Danish Government insists on carrying it 
out to keep its international role, and there are still difficulties for NPM to become a 
control tool in healthcare in Denmark (Peyton MM 2009). In China, it is not peculiar 
that the management system is under the backgrounds of Chinese culture and strongly 
affected by its traditional roots. At the managerial level, utilitarianism, bureaucracy 
and human relationship are rather thriving, especially in the public sector, based on 
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which problems spring up and some even become thorny with time. Premised on this 
situation, the health care reform is carried out not only to improve the long-term 
outlook of national public health but may also provide a prototype for future NPM 
reforms in other fields. 
1.1.4 A practice of the NPM in India’s Public Health 
Bennett and Muraleedharan (2000) interpreted the concept of the NPM as a 
broadbased reform of government organizational structures, systems and even 
philosophy the objective of which is to improve government effectiveness. The main 
factors of the NPM consist of being more responsible to customer demand, improving 
organizational framework which engage creation and rivalry, enforcing motivations 
for better performance and adopting more output-based mechanisms. According to 
Kaul (1997), all of the above are premised on the variation of the role of the 
government as ‘from a concern to do towards a concern to ensure that things are 
done’. For the purpose of ameliorating efficiency through intensifying rivalry and for 
the aim of exalting transparency in public financing, there has been a tendency that 
contracting for services becomes an acceptable method. Besides, another potential 
advantage of contracting is that accesses to services may be increased and improved 
by participation of private suppliers. For example, for India which has a 
comparatively large private sector and a preponderant bureau system, contracting is 
regarded as an attractive choice. However, among the great number of underlying 
contractors for majority of the supplementary services, in all the researched cases only 
a few tenderers showed interest in the contracts. Various reasons are given by winners 
in such tenders in Mumbai: high initial investment for market access; low profit 
margins; late service-outlay defrayal of the government and so on. It seems common 
that the government tends to be a late payer based on its honour, yet it is considered 
impractical for the running of small-sized businesses (Bennett S & Muraleedharan VR 
2000). 
According to Batley’s (1997) studies, Bennett and Muraleedharan (2000) briefed 
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task-specific capacities that associated with contracting with private provider 
organizations, directly providing these same services and regulating private providers 
as follows: 
Internal elements External elements 
Organizational and Administrative 
framework. 
Civil-public interaction. 
Competence and expertise of employees. Private-sector advancement. 
Practicability of capital and financial 
control. 
Political framework and predilection. 
 Legal and administrative composition. 
Table 1: Aspects of Capacity (Bennett S & Muraleedharan VR 2000) 
Table 1 shows which basic internal and external elements of task-specific capacities 
should be taken into account at the stage of PPP. In practice, the internal part and 
external part are complementary rather than independent, which requires subtle 
consideration and regulation of administrative management and control. 
The studies of Bennett and Muraleedharan (2000) indicated that in the field of 
catering services, the costs of contracted-out options are remarkably lower than that 
of in-house options, whereas in fact the quality of contracted-out options is also lower 
than that of in-house options in the round. Nevertheless, in the authors’ opinion, the 
problem of worse quality is not an inescapable consequence of contracting since 
improvement is still required at diversified levels in the management of such PPP 
system. Another problem is the overwhelming failure of regulation in the healthcare 
department, which is considered as a result of inadequate funds, and devaluation of 
registration fees due to inflation. In these circumstances, only a minimum of 
allowances is issued to medical councils by the government and there is also 
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dissatisfaction with the lack of discretion and freedom of medical councils. For 
policy-makers, the task of top priority is to emphasize to the private sector again that 
the government is significantly focusing on the quality of health care services 
supplied by both public and private sectors. Under the background of ingrained 
bureaucratic traditions, the highly centralized system of government has provided 
both motivations and obstructions to carry out the NPM, which means that for the 
purpose of actualization of the NPM, a reform in power structure is imperative and 
there will be great difficulty at the political level (Bennett S & Muraleedharan VR 
2000). 
1.2 Problem 
As according to Li (2013) in Chapter 3.1.1, high costs, poor quality, over-prescription 
and over-treatment are defined as the four major problems in China’s healthcare. 
Among the problems mentioned above, high costs, over-prescription and 
over-treatment are related to the concept of transaction costs, while poor quality, 
over-prescription and over-treatment are linked to the concept of institutions, both 
concepts of which are of the five basic concepts of NIE raised by Ankarloo (2006). 
1.3 Purpose 
Test the developments and predicaments of the ongoing health care reform in China 
with the new institutional economics (NIE) theories. 
1.4 Method 
Introduce theoretical materials and literatures and relevant facts and practices to show 
how the facts reflect the theories and how improvements can be made in practice. And 
through a survey study to create a better understanding of the current situation of 
public health and the ongoing health care reform in China and come to conclusion and 
give some suggestions of improvement. The theory which supports analysis is the 
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institutional change theory of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) theory which is 
defined as one of the three major theoretical foundations of the NPM theory. 
For Chapter 1, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, information searched was from books and 
websites. For Chapter 4, information was collected from a survey research of 4 
hospitals in Changchun City, Jilin Province, China. 
An important problem is that at the empirical analysis stage there is a lack of 
information from private hospitals or PPP hospitals since all participators of the 
survey stated the hospitals they work for as public hospitals. And considering local 
conditions, the survey can not be designed in a way of very open questions or in a 
way which may make a rather aggressive impression on the participators. Such 
situations may lead to deviation of the analysis and the result may not be 
comprehensive. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Textbook Review (NPM & PPP) 
Moll and Humphrey stated that NPM reforms are widely carried forward by bringing 
in market systems as imitating the way of the private sector, on the basis of the 
assumption that it is worthwhile for the public sector to draw lessons from the private 
sector on programme management and capital formation. In virtue of NPM reforms, 
the transition of resource allocation procedures shows great influence on management 
accounting and the figure of management accountants in the public sector. In 
decision-making of both long-term fund raising and short-term running, accounting 
mechanisms are paid more attention to in public management. During NPM reforms, 
the focal point of the public management is reforged from lawful considerations with 
management to effectiveness and efficiency in service supply (Moll J & Humphrey C 
2007). 
Moll and Humphrey (2007) indicated that public–private partnership (PPP) 
programmes are effective in getting over disadvantages of infrastructure programmes 
through intensifying competition and spreading the risk between the public sector and 
the private sector. However, contractors of PPP may prefer to only guarantee that their 
minimum PPP contractual service agreements are away from being infringed rather 
than maximize service performance, since it has to be taken into consideration that the 
cycle of PPP contracts is capable to impair competence. Meanwhile, there is another 
problem that premised on the assumption that every competitor in the tender has 
harmonious relationship with the correlative governmental contracting 
body/department, private contractors may be discouraged by the costs occur during 
further tender procedures. In the public sector, it is necessary for management 
accountants to keep an eye on financial accounting implications of PPP contracts and 
comprehend to what level contractual risks are shifted to the private sector compared 
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with that shifted to the public sector, since severe unexpected sequels may come out 
for the elevation of accrual-based budgeting and accounting systems in the public 
sector. Besides, another crux is that PPP can lead to various conflicts and vague, the 
ignorance of which can push management accountants in the public sector and their 
groups towards underlying unveiled standpoints (Moll J & Humphrey C 2007). 
2.2 Other Literature Review 
2.2.1 Definitions of the NPM 
Lu and Li (2007) claimed that on one hand, the NPM requires the research of 
management accounting to develop to public sectors, especially government 
departments, for which reason the content of management accounting is further 
enriched; on the other hand, the government management is changing from 
administration to public management, which anxiously requires the government to 
pay more attention to effectiveness and efficiency on the basis of routinization and 
conformance so that as a result the objective of governmental accounting is endowed 
with new substance. Under this background, the government is required to lay more 
stress on democratization, scientific nature and strict control of executive processes in 
decision-making. Therefore, it is necessary for the government to be supported with 
information by cost and management accounting information systems. The 
characteristics of the NPM including ‘3 E’ (economy, efficiency, effectiveness), 
performance focus, consumer guiding, strategic management and so on are as the 
same as the objectives of management accounting at different stages of development 
in nature (Lu JW & Li GW 2007). 
Osborne (2006) argued that the NPM is strong enough to improve transparency of the 
sophisticated operating processes of output management of public policy process. 
Sometimes, the NPM goes so far as to call in question the validity of public policy as 
a component of background of public management, stating that irrational democratic 
enforcement is forced upon the supervision and supply of public services. What is 
 13 
considered most dangerous is that the NPM has been defined as restricted and 
mono-dimensioned in capacity to cause and facilitate the supervision and domination 
of public services and public service organizations no matter if the organization is 
subordinate to the public, private or voluntary sector in a growing diversified 
environment. Besides, it is also stated that the NPM is a combination of neo-classical 
economics and rational/public choice theory. It is relevant to a decomposed situation, 
in which policy making and execution are at any rate merged and unconstrained in 
some degree, and in which execution is by means of a gather of independent service 
units that are sublimated to be in mutual rivalry. It attaches most importance to 
intra-organizational processes and management while underlining the economy and 
efficiency of the units mentioned above in offering public services (Osborne SP 2006). 
2.2.2 An Introduction of NPSM 
Shaw (2004) introduced the concept of New Public Sector Management (NPSM) in 
systems of health care. He explained that it means to suppose that public sector 
management is operated with business-like practices, while an important precondition 
is that a business view in health systems is not that different from that in other fields. 
A basic precondition behind the urgency of NPSM is that public sector managers 
have been prevented from the same types of stress/motivation frameworks that is in 
vogue in the private sector, yet it is claimed that such lacuna has retained inefficient 
bureaucratic organizations, has caused barriers for innovational development, and has 
punished rather than prized business-related employees in public sector institutions. 
Supporters of NPSM then state that current backward performance in the public sector 
is a result of problems of guaranteeing suitable motivations to chase the public 
interest, insufficiency of suitable information to define the public interest, and 
insufficiency of suitable supervising systems to guarantee that consequences are in 
vogue (Shaw RP 2004). 
To illustrate what the stress and motivations are depending on in the private sector but 
not in the conventional public sector, Shaw (2004) inserted a form of Factors 
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Affecting Managerial Incentives and Accountability as below: 
Public Sector Private Sector 
1. funds raised from taxes 1. funds raised by venture capital 
2. ownership of assets by government 2. ownership of assets by shareholders 
3. costs used to crudely estimate prices 3. market determined prices 
4. clients vote through represent 4. clients vote with their feet 
5. resource allocation based on 
non-transparent bargaining between 
interests groups & politicians 
5. resource allocation follows rules of 
efficiency 
6. bounded rationality - defined below - 
more severe in view of monopoly 
situation of public entity 
6. bounded rationality less severe in view 
of information/communication associated 
with “market clearing functions” 
Table 2: Factors Affecting Managerial Incentives and Accountability (Shaw RP 2004) 
Table 2 shows that factors in the public sector are closely related to administrative 
management and control while factors in the private sector are rather related to market 
conditions and performance. As can be deduced from the table, managerial problems 
due to uncompetitive prices, insufficient information for decision, sacrifice of 
efficiency, and monopoly may be more likely to occur in the public sector rather than 
in the private sector; while when it comes to problems due to rather unstable resource 
of funds and ownership of assets, it seems that the situation is inversed. Based on the 
rather ascendant financial situation, more market-driven strategies should be involved 
in the NPSM as to make up for its systemic shortcomings, for which reason learning 
from experience of the private sector is considered important. 
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2.2.3 NPM Reforms in Healthcare 
In Kurunmaki’s (2008) studies, it is analyzed that whether market-based reforms and 
accounting systems that are important to NPM reforms has successfully shifted the 
power chain in the field of healthcare. In Finnish healthcare reforms, strengthening 
the value of economic versus professional capital while promoting the power of 
healthcare financiers above that of service suppliers is considered as a main goal. 
Nevertheless, the marketization in Finnish healthcare has reached its bottlenecks. A 
reason is that mainly as a result of the small number of service suppliers, there seems 
to be no competitive advantages. And local governments are not intending to intensify 
competition for political reasons and it is rather difficult to establish 
supplier-demander relationships between health service experts. Another problem is 
that information offered to those liable for service procurement is rather finite and 
may not be credible. And against the assumption of healthcare reformers, it is 
considered that the monetarization of health service transactions through price and 
market systems has failed to identify differences in cost efficiency or quality of health 
service suppliers. Besides, it is suggested that hybridization should become a possible 
resolution to such problems which may even lead to structural changes of hospitals 
(Kurunmaki L 2008). 
Correia (2011) analyzed how the NPM has been envisaged and carried out in the 
Portuguese health sector. According to his studies, a foundational change of hospital 
management includes decentralization of competences from perspectives of central 
and regional governments to the perspective of hospitals, premised on which the 
board of a hospital should take responsibilities of management at asset, financial and 
administrative level. It is claimed that if the decentralization of competences is going 
well, lower dimension of decision making has to be in the charge of high-dimension 
controls, which is considered as the only method that a balanced 
Ministry-management-professionals relationship can be created and biases between 
contracted performance and actual performance can be averted. And despite 
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requirement of great transparency in the operation of NPM, accurate public evaluation 
is rigidly restricted at the bureaucratic level under political backgrounds (Correia T 
2011). 
2.2.4 A Brief Discussion of Systems of PPS and DRG 
In the studies of Abernethy, Chua, Grafton and Mahama (2006), it is claimed that 
improvement and generalization of prospective payment systems (PPSs) in major 
health care systems at the moment are worthy of most attention in health care reforms. 
PPSs refer to a foundational variation from public health cost financing to an 
output-based system, or described as casemix funding. In this approach of hospital 
financing, a complicated accounting arithmetic system premised on data of 
expenditure and amount is adopted for resource allocation. In casemix funding, 
patients will be ranked into disease categories (DRGs) and distributes to each DRG 
for expenditure examination. According to Fetter (1991), the expenditure examination 
is based on the assumption that consumption models of groups of patients (DRGs) are 
consolidated. According to Fetter and Freeman (1986) and Samuel et al (2005), 
expenditure examination manifests prices for different beltlines manufactured by 
hospitals. According to Bourn and Ezzamel (1986) and Nahapiet (1988), central 
financing pundits decide hospital financing through application of expenditure 
examination allocated to each DRG and the amount of inpatients under treatment in 
each DRG. In most of medicare governance, prospective payment programmes are 
carried out as substitutes for conventional assignment procedures in which financing 
was depending on departed cost levels and communication between medical 
institutions and central financing pundits. And according to Duckett (1994), it is 
claimed that casemix funding carries forward the developing understanding that 
conventional financing method remained impartial resource allocation and inefficient 
clinical and other work practices. According to Bourn and Ezzamel (1986) and Craig 
et al (1990), casemix accounting involves motivations to improve efficiency and 
effectiveness. Besides, the transparency of operations contrived by casemix 
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accounting offers the foundation for organizational rewards and sanctions 
(Abernethy MA, Chua WF, Grafton J & Mahama H 2006). 
2.2.5 Comparison of Different Institutional Change Theories 
Kingston and Caballero (2009) listed and discussed different theories of institutional 
change. First, they introduced collective-choice theories in which regulations are 
distinctly defined by a collective political entity inside which individuals and 
organizations criticize mutually to alter the regulations to get preferential treatment 
from such action. According to Ostrom (2005), both exogenous causes and 
endogenous causes are considered as reasons of institutional change. Second, they 
shared their view of evolutionary theories which root in Darwin’s evolutionary 
principles of variation, selection and inheritance. It is emphasized that the major 
difference between evolutionary theories and collective-choice theories takes place at 
the stage of selection which decides which regulations eventually appear. In 
evolutionary theories there is no concept of a central system, while in 
collective-choice theories there is an explicit top-down operating mechanism. 
Veblen’s (1899) evolutionary theory focuses on habits of thought while Hayek (1973) 
founded his evolutionary theory on selection at the level of social group. Levi (1990) 
underlined that some groups may be endowed with power from official regulations 
while groups that rather disadvantaged making effort to impel institutional changes by 
obtaining their agreement from current institutional plans. According to Williamson 
(2000), in transactions cost economics, transaction costs increase because of bounded 
rationality and opportunism of transacting parties. As a confirmed successful 
empirical methodology, transactions cost economics (TCE) supposes that the most 
efficient institutional forms will emerge, as an outcome of which institutional 
optimization will be achieved through a specific transaction (Kingston C & Caballero 
G 2009). 
2.2.6. The Coase Theorem 
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Felder (2001) explained the first Coase theorem as if there is no transaction cost, the 
initial distribution of tradable authorities does not influence the ultimate distribution 
or social welfare; and a deduction is that government can manage external factors 
through explicit and absolute allocation of property rights to one side or the other and 
then enabling those rights to be transacted. He also explicated the second Coase 
theorem as if there is transaction cost, the initial distribution of tradable authorities 
influences the ultimate distribution and may also influence the total amount of social 
welfare, when it influences social welfare, the initial distribution that leads to the 
larger social welfare is significant; and some deductions are (1) in determining 
between all-or-nothing allocation of tradable authorities to one side or the other, the 
government should choose the side that eventually relevant to the largest possible 
social welfare, or smallest possible social welfare loss; and (2) once an initial 
distribution of authorities is decided, there may be space for welfare developing 
transactions between private parties, however, transaction is expensive for positive 
transaction costs and transaction at best can only remove some but not all of social 
welfare loss linked to the initial distribution of authorities. In addition, he interpreted 
the third Coase theorem as if there is transaction cost, developments over and above 
those achievable through transaction are possible through a prudent allocation of 
delimited authorities, which supposes that the government can parallel and compare 
the welfare influences of optional delimitations of authorities at rather low cost and 
also supposes that the government can perform in a method that at least is close to 
dispassion and justice (Felder J 2001). 
2.2.7 An Overview of China’s Health Care Reform 
2.2.7.1 Background of the New Reform 
Ramesh, Wu and He (2012) found that the defeat of China’s healthcare reform 
through 1980s and 1990s was in some degree for the reason of insufficient focus on 
core issues of health management. For example, strategic chain reaction among 
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government, providers and users, as the same as motivation framework that forms 
their inclination and performance. The newly launched reform is a flight of ambition 
yet the lack of concern for elementary management problems the department has been 
suffering from remains the soft underbelly. During the late 1970s and the early 1980s, 
the reform had made an unprecedented success for bringing about lower infant 
mortality rate (IMR) (3.4%) and longer life expectancy (68 years) at a rather low 
expense of 3% of GDP on total expenditure on health (TEH). On a generally public 
basis, the method of fee-for-service (FFS) is widely adopted by providers and the 
national population is covered by three insurance schemes: the Government Insurance 
Scheme, Labour Insurance Scheme and Co-operative Medical System. Since the decay 
of state-owned enterprises, the ability of healthcare insurance system has fallen short 
of social demand gradually and as a result it is becoming more and more difficult for 
consumers to afford healthcare (Ramesh M, Wu X, He AJ 2012). 
2.2.7.2 Major Problems and Suggestions 
Hsiao (2007) listed four contemporary problems in China’s healthcare system: 
inadequate capital and supply of public health and precautionary practices; high cost; 
poor access; healthcare pauperization. Under the background of central planning and 
with high dependence on national finance and public supply, the public medical 
institutions have been saturated with inferior hospital beds and unprofessional staff. 
And both Co-operative Medical System in rural areas and Labour Insurance Scheme 
which has been transformed to individual medical savings accounts/catastrophic 
insurance in urban areas have reached their bottlenecks, which mean that a systemic 
evolution is imperative. He also argued that another problem is the conflict of interest 
(COI) between China’s Politburo and ministries. In Hsiao’s opinion, it is suggested 
that an independent agency as a third party to control and assess correlative work 
should be founded and put into use as a rather permanent solution to the problem 
(Hsiao WC 2007). 
Yip and Hsiao (2009) made a summary of three cardinal creeds used as a baseline for 
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the reform: powerful government administration in healthcare; promise of impartiality; 
aspiration to make attempts postulates operating in a regulated market. Based on the 
failure of resolving systemic problems, it is suggested that a change in the payment 
method and an advancement of independent agencies should be carried out. And they 
presented that the ongoing fee-for-service (FFS) payment method is a significant root 
cause of indiscriminate overprescription and overmedicalization. As examples of 
applicable models of the prospective payment method for China, Diagnosis Related 
Group (DRG) payment method for hospitals and risk-adjusted capitation payment 
method for basic healthcare suppliers are introduced (Yip W & Hsiao W 2009). 
Yip et al (2012) claimed that insufficient ability and stakeholders’ objection have 
become major constraints on the reform in motivation framework for suppliers, public 
hospital management control and establishment of a more vigorous supervision 
system. Besides, it is emphasized again that a third party as an independent and 
result-based agency should be introduced as a qualified monitor and evaluator to carry 
out mid-term revise of the programme and keep suppliers and government figures at 
their responsibilities. In addition, they demonstrated that fiscal policies towards rather 
less developed regions are effective in narrowing regional gaps in public healthcare 
(Yip WC, Hsiao WC, Chen W, Hu S, Ma J, Maynard A 2012). 
2.2.7.3 Tendencies of China’s Hospitals 
Barber et al (2013) explicated that based on their studies there are some tendencies of 
China’s hospitals listed as follows: First, impatient insurance compensation ratio will 
rise premised on ongoing government strategies. Second, retail pharmacies will 
become mainstay in dosage. Third, screening and purchasing drugs and techniques 
will depend on the best therapeutic value for price. Fourth, the growth in size of 
hospitals will slow down and restricted, and borrowing for such purposes will be 
proscribed. Fifth, the change of management models from mono-hospital to health 
system will deeply influence the strategy-making process for delivering health 
services. Sixth, the government will define particular fields to increase investment in, 
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for example, salaries, public services, management and training, based on a more 
efficient planning model (Barber SL, Borowitz M, Bekedam H, Ma J 2013) 
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3. Some Backgrounds and the Present Situation of China’s Ongoing 
Health Care Reform 
3.1 Major Problems and Visions of China’s Public Health 
When it comes to the field of public health in China, it has been put forward that high 
costs, poor quality, over-prescription and over-treatment are the four cruxes that a 
breakthrough should be made in. The introduction of the NPM requires transition of 
management control of the government from input-orientation to output-orientation, 
from hierarchical centralization to functional decentralization, from monopoly to 
competition, and from traditional conservative bureaucratic administration to focus of 
market-driven strategies (MDSs). Under the background of the chronic asymmetric 
relationship of supply and demand, a systemic reform triggered by a series of 
functional reforms is imperative. Through learning from experience of the private 
sector and actively participating in market competition, the strategies of dealing with 
the four cruxes mentioned above have achieved initial success yet there is still a long 
way to go. 
3.1.1 Major Problems 
According to Li (2013), since 2009, resolving problems of high costs, poor quality, 
over-prescription and over-treatment has been deemed to be key points of healthcare 
reforms in China. The 15% mark-up on drug prices and the compensation paid to 
hospitals regardless of the quality of care trigger over-prescription and over-treatment 
from which health workers profiteer. To deal with these problems, Henan Province 
has carried out a series of initiatives of reform in rural public hospitals, consisting of 
applying computerized clinical pathways instead of the FFS system, 
performance-based payment for treatment suppliers, and IT based quality control in 
health service institutions, which resulted in progress at the grassroots level. For 
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example, in the People’s Hospital of Yiyang County, patients’ hospital stay decreased 
by more than one day and their medical expenditure was cut down by 5~8%, yet 
during the same period there was a growth of 8.7% in the hospital’s revenues for the 
reason that better services attracted more patients. And the hospital staff was 
successfully motivated to improve daily performance. Since the establishment of the 
performance-based system, hospital staff across the county has experienced a monthly 
income growth of CNY 330 per capita. The use of hospital-wide IT platform 
improved employee performance recording process so that medical malpractice could 
be avoided by immediate control. Besides, it is also pointed out that as a result of 
better service and less payment, the physician-patient relationship has been improved 
and patient satisfaction has promoted across the county since the commencement of 
the reform (Li L 2013). At the institutional level, building an improved overall control 
system should be treated as a task of top priority for the reason that according to 
collective-choice theories there is a definite top-down operating mechanism, which 
will finalize the system of organizational performance and force related personnel 
habituated to the operating mechanism. In China, besides the lack of a rather 
advanced top-down control system, an additional problem is that there is also 
long-term absence of supervision from an independent institution as a third party. 
Moreover, a developed legal system would also help standardize the management 
control system and reduce operating against regulations. 
To make a supplementary from a strategic management perspective, Zhong (Zhong 
Nanshan, director of the Guangzhou Institute of Respiratory Diseases and 
editor-in-chief of the Journal of Thoracic Disease) introduced three key benchmarks 
for the reform: whether the problems of poor access and high cost have been settled; 
whether the physician-patient relationship has been improved; whether the medical 
personnel that are the main force of the reform have been effectively motivated. In his 
opinion, there has been no significant improvement from these perspectives for the 
past four years, and in some ways there seems even deterioration. He pointed out that 
recent violence against and killing of health care workers mostly happened in 
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outpatient departments, emergency departments and operating theatres where time is 
tight and communication is poor in big hospitals; and the core issues in the reform 
have not been paid enough attention to. To settle the problems, the most important 
thing is to make a public hospital really ‘public’, which was explained as to let the 
public hospital be state-owned and privately operated. Besides, he admitted that 
physicians have ‘grey income’ and some hospitals divide a surgery into multiple steps 
to collect money, even anesthesia alone is cut apart. The salary of a physician in a big 
hospital only holds 25% of his/her entire income, hence to survive and supply health 
care workers with rather reasonable income, hospitals make changes through 
increasing sickbeds and admitting more patients, however, such moves also result in 
the increase of medical tasks. In general, a physician of some note handles cases of 
almost fifty patients every day and patients are used to ‘queuing for hours to see the 
doctor for minutes’. Consequently, it is claimed that the core issues are systemic 
problems, which requires clarification of how public interest is shown in the values of 
public hospitals, as the reform should bring about development in public interest 
rather than in marketplace. In addition, contradictions are concentrated in big 
hospitals so that if these problems can be solved, with the example similar bottlenecks 
elsewhere can also be broken (www.nandu.com 2014). Rooting deep in national 
conditions of China, such problems may be settled by specific institutional changes 
since under traditional hierarchical control, healthcare institutions and their staff must 
conform to the rigorous standards laid down by the department in charge. 
Furthermore, judicial practice may also be introduced as auxiliary means, be 
combined with regulatory framework and always be recognized and made flexible use 
of in relevant cases by managerial staff. 
3.1.2 The Recent Trends of China’s Public Health 
In China, to keep up with the changes following accelerative urbanization and social 
reorganization, a profound reform is vigorously ongoing in public health care. Xiao 
(2013) has presented that at the moment, the reform of health care system in China 
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has a tendency towards ‘Merging Track’ that means socialized medicine will fade 
away and be replaced by a mixture of labour fundamental health insurance system and 
citizen fundamental health insurance system, which will include integrating socialized 
medicine with labour fundamental health insurance system; integrating new rural 
cooperative medical care with citizen fundamental health insurance system; and 
offering the choice to join either system to farmers whose land have been 
expropriated. It is suggested by Zhu (Zhu Fuling, professor of School of Insurance, 
Central University of Finance and Economics) that a clear distinction should be made 
between periods, which means that labourers have been covered by socialized 
medicine before an appointed time point can decide whether to join labour 
fundamental health insurance system, while those become a labourer after that time 
point are required to join the system. Furthermore, the gap between reward levels of 
health insurance will be bridged through supplementary insurance and the categories 
of premiums and proceeds will be defined clearly (Xiao D 2013). Such prospects look 
rather bright. Nevertheless, due to the late beginning, China still has a long way to go 
and is actively engaged in learning from successful experience of other countries. 
3.1.3 The Launch of Pilot Programmes and Relevant Support 
Like mushrooms after the rain, the pilot programmes have grown vigorously and been 
counted on to come to fruition so far. Liang (Liang Wannian, the head of the reform 
department of National Health and Family Planning Commission (NHFPC) and 
associate supervisor of the Health Office of Medical Reform of the State Council) 
stated that the next step of the reform will focus on launching pilot programmes in 
public hospitals including medical institutions founded by state-owned enterprises and 
averting public hospitals and other state-owned medical institutions being established 
or sold in an oversimplified and crude way through the process. According to The 
Opinions on Promoting the Development of the Health Services Industry issued by the 
State Council, the cities rich in resources of public hospitals should accelerate 
launching pilot programmes in medical institutions founded by state-owned 
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enterprises and the country should appoint some areas to launch pilot programmes in 
public hospitals, through the process of which the goals should be clearly defined; the 
enforcement and rhythm should be carefully controlled; and the pilot programmes 
launched should be able to fulfill the requirements of local health plans. Besides, it is 
suggested that the government should take action in founding and running public 
hospitals and other state-owned medical institutions in the spirit of accountability. For 
example, clarify the number, size and distribution of public medical institutions; keep 
the leading role of public medical institutions in supporting urban and rural residents 
with basic health care services; and encourage county councils and municipals to 
carry forward the reform through various methods as trust and cooperation. To 
prevent national asset from erosion and guarantee social stability, it is vitally 
important to normalize operation; protect national asset and equitable interest of 
employees; standardize liquidation, auditing and capital rating; properly complete 
personnel placement; and determine recipient on the basis of competitive selection. 
Meanwhile, it has been emphasized that there should be general consensus among 
county councils and municipals about the need for stronger post-reform management 
and control; more policy support to private medical institutions; leading post-reform 
medical institutions to achieve targets of high-level and large-scale; and more 
improved quality and standard of health care services (Lv N 2014). The suggestion 
that the government should give more support to improving public health is not a new 
proposition. Besides, a thorough plan and specific agenda should also be followed in 
order to effectively monitor and control the progress and quality through the whole 
implementation process. 
In the blueprint stage, Liu (Liu Yandong, Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC 
Central Committee and Vice Premier) proposed to push forward linked reform in 
medical treatment, medical insurance and medicine; spread county-level public 
hospital pilot programmes to 1,000 counties; guarantee optimization of high-quality 
medical resources by controlling public hospital scope and building classification 
treatment system; improve private health care and multi-site licensing of physician; 
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offer multilevel and diversified health care services; raise resident medical insurance 
subsidy standard per capita to CNY 320; expedite building system of prevention and 
cure of serious diseases; consummate basic medicine system and improve public 
health to reduce incidence of diseases; regularize circulation and price system of 
medicine to avoid and settle problems of nominal high made by medicine; cultivate 
talents of health care, build a high-effective salary system and effectively motivate 
medical personnel; fight against violence against health care workers in accordance 
with law so as to establish harmonious physician-patient relationship 
(news.xinhuanet.com 2014). Such moves will prudently push forward structural 
changes in the field of healthcare and feedbacks of launched pilot programmes will 
become valuable for further plans and practice. 
To achieve the goals of the reform, there is plenty of work that should be done at the 
basic level and social investment in health care should be more policy-supported. 
According to Li, county-level public hospitals are main body of health care system in 
China since they offer services to 0.9 billion rural residents. Currently, the deepening 
reform in health care is at a crucial turning point, a breakthrough should be made in 
the reform carried forward in county-level public hospitals so as to resolve the 
problems of poor access and high cost of health care for the masses of people. 
Complied with three principles of cooperation between higher and lower levels, 
internal motivation and external support, three guidelines are listed as a backing for 
the reform in progress: the abolition of ‘nourishing physicians with high medical 
charges’; the innovation in the system; and the motivation of health care workers. In 
addition, Liu (Liu Yandong) emphasized that an expansion of the scope of pilot 
programmes in county-level public hospitals is considered as a matter of great 
urgency. The number of counties in which pilot programmes are launched will be 
increased to 1011 before the end of the year 2014, which means 50% of counties and 
population of 0.5 billion across the country will be covered. Meanwhile, the 
optimization of health care resources should be driven on to build the system of initial 
diagnosis on basic level, classification of diagnosis and treatment, and bi-directional 
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transfer treatment. It is also suggested that illegal medical practice and false medical 
advertisement should be put on the government’s hit list, an arbitration and risk 
pooling system for medical malpractice and disputes should be built, medical ethics of 
health care workers should be focused on, and information of hospitals should be 
made known to the public, which are beneficial for establishment and maintenance of 
a harmonious physician-patient relationship (news.sina.com.cn 2014). The support to 
local health care institutions is a long-term method which may help improve 
optimization of health care resources and narrow the urban-rural divide. Furthermore, 
under tight official control a new order of offering health services may be established 
by the government. 
3.1.4 The Imbalance between Supply and Demand Calls for 
Marketization of Public Health Care 
According to Wu (Wu Mingjiang, vice-president of Chinese Medical Association and 
member of CPPCC), the new reform has brought about fruitful results while posing an 
immense challenge to various interest patterns to date. Since many problems on the 
surface were smoothed away, more underlying problems have come out and required 
to be paid attention to. It is pointed out that the core of the systemic and structural 
issues is how to provide a rather consistent long-term framework. To fit in with a 
market-centered economic system, it is suggested that a hospital should be 
transformed to an independent economic entity and show independent legal 
personality, reasonableness of fundraising channels and government responsibility in 
management control while the original administrative structure is undergoing changes. 
The only solutions to problems left over by history, ongoing problems in the reform 
and problems newly appearing in the development are carrying forward the reform 
and the development. In the wake of development in the society, the reform has been 
strongly boosted by the eruption of social demand for health care, the success of 
which is depending on broad social support and a general consensus among ministries 
(Shen Y 2014). To accomplish the reform of framework from centralized-planned to 
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market-driven and market-driving, the restructuring transformation is considered a 
key section since the proprietorship determines the position and operation of public 
healthcare institutions. 
At the moment, administrative monopoly of health care resources is still the crux of 
the matter. Since the scheme of the new reform was introduced in 2009, the problem 
of weaknesses in the health care service system at the basic level has not been 
resolved yet. On 19th Apr 2014, at the CN-healthcare.com 2014Healthcare Investment 
And Financing Forum, Cai (Cai Jiangnan, director of Healthcare Management and 
Policy Research Centre, China Europe International Business School) premised his 
argument with statistics that the share of tertiary hospitals has been growing 
sustainably even since the end of 2009; the number of outpatients of tertiary hospitals 
for the year 2011 has increased by almost 126% compared with that for the year 2005, 
while the number of non-graded hospitals was decreasing by at least 30%. Such event 
is so called inverted pyramid which was a conundrum that was intended to be solved 
through the scheme of the reform introduced in 2009. The inverted pyramid is 
referred to a fact that the health care resources which are supposed to be supporting 
the basic health care finally flood in big hospitals. Since the new reform is carried out 
in 2009, the public finance has favoured community health care and county-level 
hospitals, yet the problem has not been settled and has even been exacerbated. From 
2005 to 2010, the number of hospitals that owns more than 800 sickbeds had 
increased by 202%, making it the group of the fastest growth; the number of hospitals 
that owns fewer than 500 sickbeds had increased by 13%, making it the group of the 
slowest growth. During the same period, some hospitals with over 10,000 sickbeds 
had come out, which were nicknamed ‘giant aircraft carriers’ by Cai. According to the 
scheme of the new reform, a health care service system that is reasonably structured 
while covering both urban and rural areas should be built, to achieve the goal of 
which the principles of keeping not-for-profit medical institutions as the main body 
with for-profit medical institutions as supplement, public health care as the keynote 
and promoting common development of non-public health care should be insisted. 
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However, as shown in a set of data published by the NHFPC in 2013, in the public 
hospitals which has occupied 55% of the total percentage of the number of hospitals 
in China, the number of sickbeds has occupied 86%, the amount of outpatients has 
occupied 90% and that of inpatients has occupied 88%, which reflects obvious 
monopoly (www.chinahealthreform.org 2014). Such data indicate that when it comes 
to health care resources, the gap between tertiary hospitals and other hospitals, and the 
urban-rural gap are still wide, which suggests that further effort should be made to 
resolve the problem. 
As suggested by Cai, to solve the problem, a combination of policy instruments 
should be implemented simultaneously, which means that the reform in public 
hospitals, diversification of investment in health care, multi-site licensing of 
physicians and encouraging physicians to open their own clinics should be carried 
forward at the same time, since it is emphasized that to dismantle the administrative 
monopoly in resources, the leading role among hospitals should gradually be played 
by social not-for-profit hospitals and physicians should be endowed with more 
freedom that most of whom should gradually become self-employed professionals 
(Zheng L 2014). Since 2009, the new reform has promptly extended the coverage of 
medical insurance and reasonably eased the burden of patients, as a result of which 
many people who could not afford seeing a doctor are supplied with accesses to health 
care services. Along with an increase of demand for health care services, the supply of 
health care resources is growing, which is mainly reflected by a better medical 
environment. The growth of number and scale of hospitals has been remarkable, the 
equipments for diagnosis have been updated, and the projects of health care services 
have been developed. Nevertheless, among various health care resources, the core 
resource is defined as talents. In China, the lack of health care talents has become an 
unprecedented crisis, which is represented by the fact that almost half of 2,000,000 
physicians do not have a bachelor’s degree, causing an excessively low ratio of 
qualified physicians to the population. During the recent decade, most graduates of 
medical colleges have not chosen their career as a physician, bringing about 
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deterioration for the problem of the demand exceeding the supply in health care. It is 
deduced that the key issue of the stagnation of number and quality of talents in health 
care in China is the long-term constraint of prices of health care services and the 
ossified pricing system. The prices of health care services have severely departed 
from supply and demand, compared with prices of other services, which seem to have 
been trapped in a ridiculous cycle that the price of an outpatient is lower than that of a 
haircut in a barber shop or a cinema ticket. Such circumstances have caused a series 
of serious results: the open income of physicians is too low which demotivates 
outstanding students to go into medicine and graduates of medical colleges to practise 
medicine; physicians can only depend on excessive prescription and examination to 
make up income, which fuels contradiction between physicians and patients further; 
limited talents flood in big hospitals, which adds to the inverted pyramid and worsens 
the problems of poor access and high cost in health care. Therefore, building a 
reasonable and effective pricing system for health care services to guarantee that the 
prices of health care services reflect supply and demand has become a mission of 
great urgency (www.chinahealthreform.org 2014). There seems to be weird 
contradiction in the problem of recruiting physicians: on one hand, there is constant 
deficiency of qualified physicians; on the other hand, there have been plenty of 
complaints from presidents of public hospitals on the situation that they have to 
accept and find a place for any medical graduate allocated by Ministry of Health 
(MOH) without qualification even if the graduate is not competent for the position, 
which may be seen as an allusion to the hidden danger that corruption appears at a 
higher stage. 
At present, according to the new policy issued by the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC), the NHFPC and the Ministry of Human Resources and 
Social Security (MOHRSS), non-public medical institutions are allowed to carry out 
market-centered pricing on health care services, which has proved to be a milestone in 
the new reform for providing valuable experience to the whole pricing system for 
health care services. It is agreed that the market-centered pricing on non-public health 
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care services will be beneficial to diversification of social investment in health care 
which will bring about competition between public hospitals and non-public hospitals 
and the market prices accepted by non-public medical institutions may become 
references for public medical institutions to change the situation that the prices of 
public health care services have severely departed from supply and demand. 
Meanwhile, under the background of public medical institutions still playing the 
leading role it is supposed that the prices of health care services offered by non-public 
medical institutions are not likely to grow dramatically for the reason that the prices 
of non-public health care services are restrained by public health care. To change the 
vulnerable position of individual patient in the health care market, a price negotiation 
system for payers of health insurance and suppliers of health care services should be 
built step by step. Moreover, the government should strengthen price management and 
guarantee fair play through intervention as a third party, fighting against price 
distortion caused by monopoly, fraud and unfair competition. Under the background 
of long-term fixed prices of health care services, there is wide bias that various 
problems appearing in the health care system are due to the insufficiency of 
government investment. However, increase of government investment is never the 
only or sustainable solution. As suggested, the key to resolve the problem of 
compensation for medical institutions is to build a reasonable pricing system, for 
which a series of other problems can be settled as well (www.chinahealthreform.org 
2014). So far, the combination of economic planning and market regulation has been 
the leading direction of China’s economy which has driven structural transformation 
of most civilian industries. As pushed by the general trend, the public health 
institutions are also suggested to take active participation in market competition rather 
than survive under protection of central planning. 
3.1.5 The Results, Origins and Suggested Resolutions of 
Administrative Monopolies 
So far, the administrative monopoly of health care resources has caused two serious 
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results: the situation of the inverted pyramid structure of health care resources has 
gone even further; the insufficiency and waste of physician resources have been 
existing simultaneously and the conflict has been sharpened. According to Cai, the 
key problem in the health care system at present is the contradiction between 
administrative monopoly of health care resources and the socialization of health care 
resources. In China, since income and expenses are operated in different tracks, 
general practitioners are more like civil servant-to-be, while most general 
practitioners are multi-site licensed and working in clinics throughout the world (e.g. 
in the UK). As he pointed out, the administrative monopoly has covered two 
dimensions of administrative monopolies and seven instruments to come true. The 
first dimension is the control of public hospitals from the government. During recent 
years, though the number of private hospitals has increased fast, it is still public 
hospitals that definitely predominate. The second dimension is the control of 
resources of physicians, drugs and examinations from public hospitals, while these 
four categories of main health care resources are separately ascribed to four 
independent organizations in many countries (www.chinahealthreform.org 2014). As a 
rather common situation under control of a strong centralized government, such 
administrative monopoly of resources is considered as the headstream of a series of 
problems not only in the field of health care but also in variety of other areas in China, 
as a result of which the way to an exhaustive reform is usually long and hard to go. 
The two dimensions of administrative monopolies are actualized through seven 
instruments: the first is market access, referring to the permission; the second is 
planning; the third is administrative grading, which hierarchizes hospitals and 
physicians into different ranks and is criticized by Cai for the reason that an advanced 
system of quality management control and patient comments are valid enough for 
evaluation of hospitals and physicians; the fourth is formalized staffing, which is a 
threshold that difficult to cross in development of private health care and competition 
of public health care; and the rest three are research outlay, social health insurance 
and governmental pricing. It is claimed that if the seven policy instruments mentioned 
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above are not changed, it will be impossible for the goal of rising the percentage of 
sickbeds in private hospitals to 20% to be achieved. In the future, if socialization of 
health care resources has come true, a hospital, no matter public or private, will no 
longer belong to any government sector or individual, which means that its facilities 
and equipments are open to the society and for use by signatory physicians; while a 
physician is legally permitted to sign contracts with multiple hospitals and work for 
multiple hospitals as a result of socialization of physicians 
(www.chinahealthreform.org 2014). The discussion of the seven policy instruments 
has covered the main ‘short slabs’ and also future developing directions in further 
marketization of China’s health industry. And with complete socialization of health 
care resources, it will be possible for signatory physicians to acquire a franchise for 
independent therapy and prescription. 
In a narrow sense, the power of market can be defined as the power of profitability, 
according to which Cai held an negative opinion on either the government or the 
for-profit market to play a leading role in health care and argued that to let 
not-for-profit health care prevail in the area represents the fundamental law of the 
industry and the general trend throughout the world. To realize socialization of health 
care resources, it is important to let not-for-profit hospitals in the society play the 
leading role progressively, let most physicians become self-employed professionals, 
forge diversified links with hospitals, and build a price negotiation system that 
contains both sides of supply and demand. It is also to encourage social investment in 
health care, foundation of not-for-profit hospitals, motivational policies as in taxation, 
control of the percentage of for-profit hospitals, and transformation of current public 
hospitals through absorbing social investment, holding shares, hiving off and so on 
(www.chinahealthreform.org 2014). At this stage, the policy support to allow private 
capital to participate in health care and to generalize self-employment of physicians 
should be carried out in a planned way, for which it is suggested that the government 
should also work on developing a market environment with more opportunities of 
fairness. 
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To enlarge on the topic, Cai listed four ways, the first of which is the reform in public 
hospitals, defined as the reform of storage. For incremental reform, it is strongly 
recommended to trigger the development of physician owned clinics. In the reform in 
public hospitals, the structural reform of legal person management should be carried 
out in most public hospitals, which means that the power of management of personnel 
that is of special essentiality, finance and properties should be released to hospitals by 
the government. The formalized staffing and the administrative grading of hospitals 
and physicians should be abolished through ‘Double Track’ step by step, while 
diversified participation and cooperative management are encouraged for some public 
hospitals to be converted to social not-for-profit hospitals through assimilation of 
investment from enterprises and the society. Besides, a system transformation can be 
gone through in some hospitals like worker’s hospitals attached to some large 
enterprises. The second is diversified operation of hospitals, which means that 
founding social not-for-profit hospitals should be encouraged, for which reason large 
enterprises and the society should be encouraged to invest in social not-for-profit 
hospitals through motivational policies as a deduction in tax, and the percentage of the 
number of for-profit hospitals should be moderated. During the transition period, 
some policy support as low-level profit sharing and disinvestment of seed capital after 
an agreed date can also be taken into consideration. The third is carrying out 
multi-site licensing of physicians, which means that the decision of whether the 
physician can work for the hospital should be made through negotiation between the 
physicians and the hospital. And exchange of physicians between public hospitals and 
private hospitals should be encouraged, in which way to enhance cooperation between 
public hospitals and private hospitals. The fourth is encouraging physicians to open 
their own clinics, which means to encourage and help physicians to found private 
clinics, cooperative clinics and clinic chains that focusing on offering services of 
basic health care and general practice to attract patients to let their demand of basic 
health care, treatment of common diseases and frequently occurring diseases to be 
met in physician owned clinics (www.chinahealthreform.org 2014). Here all the four 
ways mentioned above are designed in order to create a better market environment 
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which would effectively reflect market readjustment in regulation of the market of 
products and services of health care. 
3.1.6 The Urban-Rural Divide 
Wang shared his opinion that whether the reform is successful should be assessed as 
depending crucially on whether the short-term and the long-term goals designed when 
the reform was started in 2009 have been achieved. For example, the comments of the 
reform does not depend on whether the index has been done or whether the reform in 
a community hospital has succeeded but depends on whether the problems of poor 
access and high cost in health care have been settled since it is included in the initial 
short-term goals. At the moment, there are 960,000 medical institutions including 
clinics and rural health centres, and 24,300 urban hospitals among which 13,440 are 
public hospitals while about 10,000 of the rest are private hospitals (health.sohu.com 
2014). Such data shows a fact that in the urban area, the number of public hospitals is 
a third more than that of private hospitals. However, taking the amount of admitted 
patients into consideration, the gap between public hospitals and private hospitals may 
become even wider. Besides, another fact is that an overwhelming majority of patients 
heading for general hospitals would prefer public hospitals; while it is as the same 
deeply ingrained in their mind that private hospitals are not worth visiting unless 
considered as special hospitals for some particular diseases. Such deepseated bias has 
also added fuel to preventing China’s healthcare industry from further marketization 
and socialization. 
According to the statistics from the NHFPC from January to October 2013, during the 
period the number of national outpatients has been 5.81 billion, 2.19 billion of which 
were from urban hospitals while 3.43 billion of the rest were from rural hospitals. The 
number of national inpatients during the same period has been 0.152 billion, 
overwhelming majority of which were from urban hospitals while about 960,000 were 
from rural hospitals. Meanwhile, the number of health care workers across the country 
was about 9.12 million, almost 5 million of which were from urban hospitals. 89.9% 
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of the amount of national outpatient treatments was from urban hospitals, 90% of 
which was from urban public hospitals, which means that 85.1% of the amount of 
national outpatient treatments was from secondary and tertiary hospitals. When it 
comes to national inpatients, 88.8% was from urban public hospitals, 86.6% was from 
8,395 secondary and tertiary hospitals and the turnover of sickbeds in tertiary 
hospitals has reached 103.8%, though the turnover of sickbeds ought not to exceed 
100% theoretically. Such high turnover is a result of too many sickbeds having been 
added in the wards and even the corridors of hospitals, which means that the number 
of inpatients is far beyond the load capacity of the hospital (health.sohu.com 2014). 
To date, to give a perfect solution to the problem of poor access for equitable 
distribution of rather limited health care resources is still ‘a hard nut to crack’. From a 
perspective of long-term causal relationship, such trouble can also be viewed as 
disastrous effect of original irrational allocation of health care resources. 
3.1.7 Total Cost Level and Self-supporting Level 
It is pointed out that the about 8,000 big public hospitals have become core areas of 
poor access and the aporia of the reform in the past two or three decades. In the past 
reform, secondary and tertiary hospitals which composed 90% of the main body that 
offers health care services have never been involved, which should be defined as the 
main contradiction in the reform. During recent years, the costs of outpatient and 
inpatient treatments have still been growing, which means that the problem of high 
cost in health care has never been resolved and there is even deterioration. For the 
year of 2012, the total cost in national health care has been CNY 2,891.4 billion, CNY 
2,135.8 per capita and an increase of 18.7%; while the total cost was about CNY 
2,400 billion for the year of 2011, of which 30.7% was covered by central and local 
public finance, 34.6% was covered by the society, and 34.8% was at patients’ own 
expense. Compared with the situation in Japan, only 12.8% of the total cost in 
national health care was at patients’ own expense. In China, the total cost in national 
health care accounts for 5.15% of GDP, which is lower than that of 9.2% in South 
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Africa, 8.8% in Brazil and 5.6% in Russia but higher than 4.2% in India. If the 
percentage in China rises to 10%, the total cost in national health care will rise to 
4,000~5,000 billion while the percentage at patients’ own expense dropping from 
present 40% to about 35%. Nevertheless, the absolute value is keeping growing and 
much higher than that of developed countries (health.sohu.com 2014). In China, a fact 
is that permanent labourers attached to state-run enterprises and public institutions 
have been supported with much more advantages in achieving public health services 
than labourers in other situations, which reflects the problem of economic and social 
partiality upon resource allocation in the national public health system that also 
requires concern. 
3.1.8 Three ‘Vague’ Circumstances 
According to Wang, there are three circumstances of ‘vague’ in the reform. The first is 
that it is unclear that how much money public hospitals should spend, though the 
income of public hospitals is rather clear that the revenue from sales of medicine 
accounts for 3% in outpatient treatments and 41.1% in inpatient treatments. If the 
status of ‘nourishing physicians with high medical charges’ has been debarred, it is 
not an alarmist talk that public hospitals may not be able to exist for a month since 
50% of their earning is from sales of medicine. At the moment, public hospitals are 
busy making profit most of the time while relying on the government for the rest. In 
another word, there are actually no public hospitals in China except for their 
state-owned assets, since none of them provide services of public interest while all 
maintaining operation on the basis of sales of medicine (health.sohu.com 2014). To 
carry forward improvement, it is of significance for the government to find out the 
legitimate cost of public hospitals, crack down on cases of exorbitant medical charges, 
and build an effective monitor and control system based on scientific standardization 
and performance measurement, while exploring new economic growth points for 
public hospitals. 
The second is that the real utilization rate of the premiums of the three main basic 
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health insurances is obscure. Meanwhile, the combination of the three main basic 
health care insurances of the Labour Insurance Scheme, Government Insurance 
Scheme and Co-operative Medical System is always called for since the current 
system is considered unequal. For example, it is unfair that a farmer can only acquire 
a farmer’s insurance while a cadre acquiring a cadre‘s insurance under the 
background that they are both residents of China. In 2013, it was declared during the 
two sessions (NPC and CPPCC) that the three insurances would be merged and in the 
charge of one department, and a schedule was soon issued by the State Council, in 
which it was required that the combination and handover should be accomplished 
before June 2013. However, such work has not been done so far, which is due to the 
power struggle between departments, though covered with a varnish of a strict 
selection of the route to reform (health.sohu.com 2014). Through nationwide 
reconnaissance, the government would be clear about the reality of utilization of the 
premiums of the three main basic health insurances, or else a new scheme as a 
combination of different schemes would be put on the agenda. And to prevent 
progress from being held up through bureaucratic processes such as the power 
struggle between departments, it may be necessary to establish a new agency to deal 
with relevant issues as a third party which is qualified, task-centered and 
result-measurable. 
The third is that the result of evaluation of investment in public insurance that raised 
by the government is unknown. During the two sessions in 2013, according to the 
budget for health insurance submitted by the Ministry of Finance, among CNY 995.2 
billion that has been raised for the three insurances, CNY 308.2 billion was raised by 
fiscal, accounting for 31.4%; the expenditure was CNY 880.5 billion and the surplus 
was CNY 114.7 billion, rolling savings were CNY 912.4 billion. Nevertheless, in the 
Labour Insurance Scheme of CNY 618.9 billion, only CNY 7 billion was raised by 
the government, though the Labour Insurance Scheme is defined as the most 
significant part among the three main insurances. So it is questioned that where the 
CNY 880.5 billion raised by the government has been spent on, how it has been 
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working and what effect it has brought about. However, even whether these 
perspectives have been appraised is doubtful (health.sohu.com 2014). To make better 
financial management and refrain from corruption, it is suggested that the government 
should improve cost transparency and introduce a more advanced supervision system 
within which public officials can be held accountable for their actions. 
3.2 The Trial of PPP in China’s Public Health 
In China’s health care reform, it has been claimed that benchmarking is rather difficult 
since there is misalignment between investor’s and the hospital’s evaluation of assets. 
Besides, there is insufficiency of criteria to measure the hospital’s invisible assets as 
brand and governmental academic support. However, it also seems that the PPP has 
achieved excellent results in development of private health care and reallocation of 
local health resources, which indicates that it is worth perpetuating across the country 
as a kind of successful experience. Furthermore, a more advanced and open grading 
system supports private hospitals and hospitals of PPP with better efficiency through 
grading processes and more equal opportunities to compete with public hospitals in 
the market. 
Since the failure of property rights reform in the last round of the reform, the NHFPC 
has been prudent in PPP all through. At the moment, as the exploration of the reform 
is carried forward, the discussion of the PPP has been refined to a high degree, yet the 
political circle, the industrial community and the academic world still have not 
reached an agreement on the PPP in the field of health care. In supporters’ opinion, it 
is widely endorsed that the foundation of multi-invested hospitals can be realized 
through generalization of the PPP since social investment is an external boost and the 
PPP is a functional solution to the problems of low flexibility, effectiveness and 
efficiency in the public hospital system. Gao (Gao Jiechun, head of Hospital 
Management Research Institute, Fudan University) affirmed that the technology of 
public hospitals and the capital of private enterprises are mutually complementary, 
with the brand effect of foreign capital management which would set a best example 
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of the reform in public hospitals. In fact during the earlier years similar projects have 
been researched and tailored in Shanghai. Nevertheless, the opponents claimed that 
the PPP may cause erosion of state-owned assets since there are legal and moral 
queries on public resources being invested in for-profit hospitals. For example, if a 
not-for-profit hospital is founded on the basis of the PPP, facing the limitation of 
non-dividend, social investment may profiteer through ‘grey operation’ in sacrifice of 
interests of the hospital and even patients (www.jkb.com.cn 2014). The opinion from 
either side is based on some reality in China’s health care. To avert erosion from ‘grey 
operation’, there is not only a call for system reform in health care but also 
requirement for restructuring at a higher level, which is rather sophisticated and of 
more difficulty in operation; and to achieve the goal of which the level of individual 
risk-taking is another critical factor that retards qualified public officials from taking 
the task. 
According to Zhong (Zhong Dongbo, associate director of the NHFPC of Beijing 
City), the purpose of social investment in not-for-profit hospitals is always tax 
advantage, and private not-for-profit hospitals are not going well due to the limitation 
of current policy. It is also mentioned that the decisive role the market plays in 
resource allocation is only suitable for economic reform and does not fit social reform, 
for which reason the PPP in the field of health care should be dealt with at the 
discretion. Besides, the PPP is not the only avenue to realize the foundation of 
multi-invested hospitals since other means as reasonable policy support can also 
contribute to development of private hospitals. Though there is still theoretical 
argument, the reform in public hospitals including those adopted PPP has been 
generalized across the country. Dong (Dong Mei, partner of Beijing subsidiary of 
KPMG) said that among her clients, a common fact is that the investor’s and the 
hospital’s evaluation of assets often mismatch and there is a lack of standard to 
measure the hospital’s invisible assets as brand and governmental academic support. 
Chen (Chen Fang, vice-president of Anzhen Hospital) indicated that the hospital 
introduced social investment for cooperation and the government also agreed to grant 
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a piece of land. However, the issue has been hung up for two years since the hospital 
is not able to raise fund for land transfer fee of CNY 0.2 billion and the firm which 
has been established for the cooperation is not allowed to accept the land as a 
for-profit institution. Zhu (Zhu Hengpeng, director of Public Policy Research Centre 
of Economic Institute, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) claimed that a principle 
of public and transparency is of vital importance in the reform in public hospitals. If 
public hospitals expand on the basis of their monopolistic and dominant position, 
social investment will have to be in the control of big public hospitals. Liang argued 
that there are various forms for the reform in public hospitals including property 
rights reform, management system reform, operation reform and so on. Reasonable 
positioning is important and local health planning and medical institution planning 
should work. It is emphasized that basic government responsibility should be 
supervised, while national assets, labourer rights and social stability being guaranteed 
in the reform (www.jkb.com.cn 2014). All standpoints above are premised on the 
existing circumstances of public health in China and are around the national ideal of 
construction of harmonious society, which should be taken into careful consideration 
during implementation of the reform and necessary supports should be provided to 
adapt to local situations and emergencies. 
In answer to the call, large amount of private capital is put in merger and foundation 
of hospitals, which triggers fresh enthusiasm of investment in health care. In an 
interview, many investors indicated that the corresponding rise of investment in 
county-level hospitals is a result of price scissors of supply and demand in the area of 
health care. And it is suggested by some experts that the government should 
conscientiously play the role of ruler and public interest defender so as to activate 
dynamic of social investment in health care. At the moment, a trait of social 
investment in foundation of medical institutions is racing to top out in the value chain 
of the industry. During the recent two years, pharmacy enterprises, medical 
instruments and financial funds all have accelerated processes of foundation, takeover 
and custody of hospitals. For example, during two months in the year of 2013, Fosun 
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Pharma, headquartered in Shanghai, has taken over two big hospitals which are 
Nanyang Tumour Hospital of Guangzhou City and Central Hospital of Chancheng 
District, Foshan City, both in Guangdong Province. Meanwhile, Hengkang Medical 
Group, headquartered in Gansu Province, has taken over equities of five private 
hospitals including Better Tomorrow Hospital of Deyang City and Well-being 
Hospital of Qionglai City, both in Sichuan Province and so on (news.xinhuanet.com 
2014). The tendency reflects a bright prospect of privatization and marketization of 
health care services in China. It also implies a reallocation of existing health care 
resources through the process of which further progress has been made to achieve the 
optimization of total national health care resources. 
According to statistics from the NHFPC of Hubei Province, the number of private 
hospitals that newly sanctioned to be built across the province was 32 for the year of 
2012, while the number was 130 for the year of 2013. So far, social capital has been 
frequently flowing to county-level public hospitals. In November 2013, Kangmei 
Pharmaceutical signed a contract with the local government of Meihekou City, Jilin 
Province, taking over three county-level public hospitals which are local Maternal and 
Child Care Centre, Friendship Hospital and Traditional Chinese Medical Hospital. 
Having taken over five public hospitals including Children’s Hospital of Kunming 
City, Yunnan Province and 999 Brain Hospital, Guangdong Province and so on, China 
Resources Pharmaceutical Group Limited has been approached to take over Gaozhou 
Public Hospital, Guangdong Province through the year of 2013. Fang (Fang Pengqian, 
vice-president of Tongji Health Care Management School, Huazhong University of 
Science and Technology) shared his opinion that compared with private investment in 
health care scattered over the country ten years ago, there are three characteristics of 
current social investment in health care: the change of main body from grassroots to 
capital; the change of mode from mainly foundation to laying equal stress on both 
foundation and merger; the change of operation from chasing short-term profit to 
pursuing long-term profit. As the market is being activated by capital, with 
improvement of quality, professionality, effectiveness and efficiency, there is no doubt 
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that the drift of social investment in health care is capable to make up for 
insufficiency of total amount of China’s health care resources (news.xinhuanet.com 
2014). The development of county-level hospitals is considered as will have amazing 
results in relieving the pressure of big hospitals. As the invested hospital operates well, 
there will be high expectation for considerable return on investment, and then a 
virtuous cycle will be created. At the moment, there is still broad development space 
in this area and a growing number of local governments have voluntarily released 
information of local hospitals and look for investors. 
During the recent three years, the initiative of social investment in health care has 
remarkably promoted. Besides the stimulation of policy of encouraging private 
hospitals, an important reason is that the reform, especially in public hospitals, has 
brought about three opportunities to encourage investment in county-level hospitals: 
firstly, the reform stimulates demand for health care while increasing channels of 
supplying health care services. Under the background of the reform, the county-level 
hospitals which were often ignored by investors in the past suddenly become 
attractive for the future profitability, taking Phoenix Healthcare Group trusting 
Hospital of Mentougou District for example, as shown in prospectus published by 
Phoenix Healthcare Group, it has invested CNY 75,000,000 in custody of the hospital, 
though annual management fee is only CNY 5,000,000, the profit from supply chain 
of drugs and instruments for the year of 2012 has exceeded CNY 6,000,000 and as the 
number of patients has been growing dramatically, the profit from supply chain for the 
first-half year of 2013 has almost reached CNY 6,000,000; secondly, the policy of that 
a patient of even some serious disease should be possible to be cured within the 
county he/she belongs to pushes local governments to carry out decentralization of 
hospitals since to achieve the goal it is impossible to depend on effort of only public 
hospitals and contracting a loan to develop is legally banned, which means that local 
officials have to give up considering public hospitals as ‘their own yards’ where they 
are powerful enough to arrange personnel and enjoy free health care since it is not 
difficult for the government to get loan from banks, objectively effectively offering 
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more opportunities for social investors to merge, trust and build county-level hospitals; 
thirdly, optimization of environment brings about sense of security for investors, an 
example is Xinli Hospital of Nayong County, Guizhou Province, which is a private 
hospital established less than eight years ago, the number of annual outpatients of 
which has exceeded 50,000, far more than that of local public hospitals. According to 
Huang (Huang Wenzhe, president of Xinli Hospital), as the reform is carried forward, 
local opinions on supporting and encouraging social investment in health care are 
gradually being merged in agreement. In standard application, staff title award and 
medical insurance qualification, the barriers to private hospitals are gradually 
surmounted. In 2011, when Xinli Hospital was applying for secondary hospital 
examination, the process was supposed to be long and hard for a private hospital, yet 
in fact it was fast and smooth. Thereafter Xinli Hospital has become the first private 
secondary hospital in the province. In competition with public hospitals, there is no 
doubt that the market pricing on health care services in non-public medical 
institutions supplies local non-public hospitals with more market-centered regulations 
(news.xinhuanet.com 2014). The examples above show how the three opportunities 
have motivated investors to favour county-level hospitals. In addition, the level of 
economic development of a county would also become a key factor for an investor to 
decide whether to invest in a hospital of the county. 
3.3 New Way to Dispose of Medical Disputes 
In medical dispute resolution, an organization has been founded as a third party for 
the purpose and relevant processes based on amount of compensation involved have 
been laid down for operation. 
According to statistics from the MOH, the number of riots of medical dispute 
profiteering among China was 17,243 in 2010, about 7,000 more than that of five 
years ago. The number of violence against health care workers was 2,240 for eight 
months of 2013, increased by 20% compared with that of 1,865 for the whole year of 
2012. Besides, according to investigations of Chinese Hospital Association, the 
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percentage of hospitals that had suffered from violent attacks against health care 
workers during 2012 has been up to 63.7%, and the average number of such attacks 
happen annually per hospital is 27 (news.sina.com.cn 2014). To break off limitations 
of traditional settlements, the Medical Dispute Mediation Committee (MDMC) has 
been founded. According to the investigation, 67.1% of hospitals indicated that they 
have resolved disputes through the MDMC and the percentage of dealing with 
disputes through the MDMC is high. The percentage of hospitals that have the 
percentage of dealing with disputes through the MDMC has been up to 30% and 
above is almost 70%, 16.9% of which have the percentage of dealing with disputes 
through the MDMC has even reached 90%. As supported by the data above, it is 
affirmed that the MDMC has positive significance in dealing with medical disputes 
and this mode is worth popularization. However, on the other hand, it is also pointed 
out that only 32.2% of hospitals take sides on the issue that the mediation of the 
MDMC is effective, which shows insufficient confidence in the mediation of the 
MDMC in medical disputes (Hu J 2014). Through disadvantages emerged, the 
experiment of MDMC has still proved its superiority in dealing with medical disputes. 
However, since there is a lack of information of the reasons why only less than one 
third of the number of hospitals considered the mediation of the MDMC as effective, 
further investigation may be required to analyze how improvement should be made in 
the work of MDMC. 
In principle, in the case of the compensation is above CNY 20,000, the medical 
institution is obligated to inform the patient to submit application for mediation to the 
MDMC, and the MDMC should close the case in 30 business days since the date of 
acceptance of application. In the case of the compensation is CNY 20,000~100,000 
and there is debate on medical liability between the physician and the patient, the 
MDMC should hold a consultation of experts and the liability between the two sides 
should be clarified in the submission written by the experts. In the case of the 
compensation is above CNY 100,000 and there is debate on medical liability between 
the physician and the patient, the MDMC should commission a medical association or 
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an institution holding the same qualification to go through technical appraisal process 
of medical malpractice or medical damage to clarify the liability (Huang H & Wen Y 
2014). These standards have been set on the basis of present situation of China’s 
health care that closely related to national conditions. Nevertheless, considering the 
diversity and complicacy of possible situations in practice, such roughly defined 
categories also reflect underlying disadvantages and risks due to sacrifice of accuracy 
and flexibility. 
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4. Empirical Analysis 
A survey of hospital management as in the first part of appendix (6.1) based on the 
five proposals to define the essential characteristics of institutional change presented 
by North (1993) was carried out and replies from 4 hospitals have been collected. To 
ensure that replies can be effectively collected and the resource of information is 
rather reliable, all the hospitals selected are located in Changchun City, Jilin Province, 
China. To suit local situations, the questions sent out are in Chinese and are designed 
not complex or confusing and all of them are choice questions (some are true-false 
choice and some are multiple choice) directly related to running a hospital from an 
actual perspective. The names of people who took part in the survey and hospitals 
they belong to are listed as below; and all participators are in a position of 
management: 
Name Hospital 
Liu Lili No.1 Clinical Hospital of Chinese 
Medicine Academy, Jilin Province 
Jia Chao No.2 Bethune Hospital Attached to Jilin 
University 
Xu Gongbin General Hospital Attached to FAW（First 
Automobile Works）Group Corporation 
Zhang Ling China and Japan’s Friendship Hospital 
Attached to Jilin University 
Table 3: People and Hospitals Involved in the Survey 
The answers from surveyed hospitals are exhibited in Table 4 in Chapter 6.2. 
The answers to Question 1, Question 2, Question 3 and relevant additional questions 
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showed that all surveyed hospitals are public and tertiary hospitals, and most have 
experienced bottlenecks in grading. These questions are related to the first of North’s 
(1993) five proposals of the continuous interaction of institutions and organizations in 
the economic setting of scarcity and hence competition is the key to institutional 
change, since it seems that on one side the existing institutions have squeezed 
hospitals’ effort on the way to be identified as a tertiary hospital and to get in 
conformity with the construction of national healthcare insurance system, and on the 
other side the reality of that the title of tertiary hospital has been ‘high in gold’ is 
nurtured and sustained by the difficulty during the process of examination. The 
problem is that such interplay even worsens the situation mentioned in the following 
paragraph by manufacturing barriers for hospitals other than tertiary hospitals in 
competition due to prejudice in demanders’ mind, for which reason there is 
essentiality for a new interaction to be created so as to surmount the barriers on an 
institutional perspective. 
The answers to Question 4, Question 5, Question 6 and relevant additional questions 
indicated that there is still difficulty to keep the balance between supply and demand 
in public hospitals. These questions are related to the fourth of North’s (1993) five 
proposals of perceptions are derived from the mental constructs of the players, since it 
is still the mainstream for patients or demanders to prefer tertiary hospitals in cities 
rather than clinics, community hospitals and rural hospitals. Thus it can be derived 
that to resolve the problem of supply-demand imbalance, it is of emergent 
significance to direct mental changeover of the great mass of average demanders. 
The answers to Question 7, Question 8, Question 9 and a relevant additional question 
represented that high cost and inefficiency in treatment-payment process is still a 
problem. These questions are also related to the fourth of North’s (1993) five 
proposals of perceptions are derived from the mental constructs of the players, based 
on suppliers’ perspective hence to be distinguished from those based on demanders’ 
perspective in the above paragraph; since there is a disregard for actual needs of 
patients or demanders shown by hospitals or suppliers. Accordingly, to deal with the 
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problem, it is suggested that suppliers should consider and optimize the user 
experience for demanders, and establish an effective motivation and reward system or 
self-supervision system. 
The answers to Question 10, Question 11, Question 13, Question 14 and relevant 
additional questions stated that there is rather fierce competition in the market and the 
competition has stimulated evolution and innovation towards both technological and 
institutional dimensions. These questions are related to the second and third of 
North’s (1993) five proposals of rivalry compels organizations to keep investing in 
skills and knowledge to survive, and the institutional structure directs the types of 
skills and knowledge perceived to have the maximum pay-off, since survival is the 
most fundamental objective for a for-profit organization and it has become common 
sense that science and technology are the primary productive forces. At this stage, 
most of status deserves affirmation since all surveyed hospitals have benefited from 
the government’s support to national healthcare from the perspectives of operation, 
innovation and evolution at the practical level; except for that one of the surveyed 
hospitals has not been involved into the pilot programme, for which reason it seems 
that the link between involvement into the pilot programme and preservation of a 
dominant position in competition does not exist. 
The answers to Question 12, Question 15 and relevant additional questions reflected 
that some stereotyped momentum has become the main constraint on some important 
normal execution for which rather strong operational hazard of hospitals underlies. 
These questions are related to the fifth of North’s (1993) five proposals of the 
economies of range, complementation, and network externalities of an institutional 
matrix make institutional change overwhelmingly incremental and path dependent, 
since it seems that there are two major problems due to long-term path dependence. 
First, it is still a norm that the director of a hospital is not empowered to 
employ/dismiss a physician, which on a positive side somehow prevents the director 
from relevant misfeasance, yet on a negative side for a certainty impinges on 
autonomy of the hospital and also indirectly impedes the progress of national 
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generalization of multi-site licensing of physician. Second, although besides 
traditional ways of negotiation and legal approaches, it seems that mediation or 
arbitration by a qualified third party is gradually being recognized in the field of 
health care; on the other side the fact is that hospitals still commit themselves to 
resolving medical disputes, and the old situation that the hospital often becomes a 
victim in such settlement is not changed. Therefore to settle the problems, it requires 
institutional changes for anti-path dependence and the establishment of new executive 
order. 
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5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, as shown from different perspectives, the NPM has made headway in 
China’s health care reform in a manner. Through the processes of breaking 
bottlenecks, the NPM experiences its self-improvement as well under the background 
with Chinese characteristics. However, since the programme is suffering from a 
deficiency of an effective monitoring and evaluation system, there may be a lack of 
cost efficiency, and some confusion about how the reform is virtually going on and 
what the appropriate benchmarks should be. In the future, an advanced monitoring 
and evaluation system should be set up which will lead to effective regulation and 
standardization of the reform. Besides, more attention should be paid to participation 
of private capital and further marketization of public health services, since to bridge 
the gulf between supply and demand, a transition from bureaucratic administration to 
market-driven management and even market-driving management is imperative. 
Other than that, more openness and courage of the government to learn from 
successful experience from the private sector and to support the private sector with 
more policy preferences would be favourable in the long run. 
The survey designed on the foundation of North’s (1993) five proposals to define the 
essential characteristics of institutional change revealed some problems and therefore 
some relevant suggestion is offered for further solution to each problem. Even though 
the ongoing reform has achieved some concrete results, for example, public hospitals 
have developed their core competence in market competition and are making effort to 
maintain competitiveness; there are still maladies in public hospitals that of which 
some are generated from defective interactions, some appear to be aroused by 
stereotype and some can be ascribed to path-dependence. However, as for the reason 
that there is a lack of information from private and PPP hospitals, the situation of such 
hospitals remains unknown and may lead the study to inevitable partiality. So far, 
China has been in principle ‘on the right track’ to carry out institutional changes in the 
field of management and control of public health care. Nevertheless, compared with 
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other countries those have already established relatively advantaged institutions, 
China still has plenty to learn since the reform is an arduous task and the road is long. 
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6. Appendix 
6.1 Survey Questions 
1. Which situation is in accord with your hospital? 
A. Public                B. Private              C. Public-private partnership 
If your answer is A, will your hospital accept social investment in the future? 
A. Yes                  B. No                 C. Not sure 
2. Is your hospital a tertiary hospital? 
A. Yes                  B. No 
Has your hospital experienced any bottlenecks in grading? 
A. Yes                  B. No 
3. Is the national healthcare insurance card available in your hospital? 
A. Yes, for all diseases     B. Yes, for some diseases  C. No 
4. Does your hospital cooperate with other hospitals on DRG? 
A. Yes                  B. No                 C. Not sure 
5. Has your hospital suffered from tension of supply and demand between physicians 
and patients? 
A. Yes                  B. No 
If yes, what action will the hospital take? 
A. To ensure that a patient can be treated in time, arrange another physician for a 
patient waiting in the queue with the patient’s permission. 
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B. To ensure that a patient can keep his/her choice of physician, arrange another time 
for a patient waiting in the queue with the patient’s permission. 
C. Cooperate with other hospitals. 
D. Remain standstill. 
E. Otherwise (please amplify) 
6. Is there an inpatient department in your hospital? 
A. Yes                  B. No 
If yes, has there been tension of supply and demand between the number of beds and 
the number of patients? 
A. Yes                  B. No 
7. Has your hospital carried out PPS as a method of payment? 
A. Yes                  B. No                 C. Not sure 
If yes, is it required for the patient who succeeds in making an appointment to hold 
the hospital’s visit card? 
A. Yes                  B. No                 C. Not sure 
8. In your hospital, does the situation of ‘patients giving up treatment due to 
incapacity of affording relevant costs’ exist? 
A. Yes                  B. No                 C. Not sure 
9. In your hospital, which factors are effective on avoiding over-prescription and 
over-treatment? 
A. The government’s performance measurement of healthcare services. 
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B. The insurance companies’ supervision. 
C. Competition with new healthcare products. 
D. Otherwise (please amplify) 
10. Is your hospital in a fierce competition locally/among hospitals of the same kind 
nationwide? 
A. Yes                  B. No 
If yes, then which position is your hospital in? 
A. Dominant             B. Medium            C. Inferior 
11. Has your hospital been involved into the pilot programme of current health care 
reform? 
A. Yes                  B. No 
If yes, which of the following pilot activities has your hospital participated in? 
A. Eradicate ‘nourishing physicians with high medical charges’ and build a scientific 
compensation system. 
B. Cooperate with other hospitals to build a DRG system. 
C. Control excessive and unreasonable growth of health care costs. 
D. Otherwise (please amplify). 
12. In your hospital, does the director have the power to employ/dismiss a physician? 
A. Yes                  B. No 
Does the director have the power to purchase expensive equipment? 
A. Yes                  B. No 
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13. Is your hospital having profit or loss at the moment? 
A. Profit                B. Loss                C. Balance 
14. Has your hospital been benefited from the government’s support to national 
healthcare from the perspectives of operation, innovation and evolution at the 
practical level? 
A. Yes                  B. No 
If yes, which of the following has strongest effect for your hospital at the practical 
level? 
A. Financial support (including tax preferences). 
B. Cooperation with other hospitals and relevant institutions for which the 
government acts as a go-between. 
C. Introduction and allocation of talented human resource. 
D. Introduction and allocation of new technology and equipment. 
E. Improvement of the law to defend rights of both physicians and patients. 
F. Otherwise (please amplify). 
15. Has your hospital suffered from medical disputes? 
A. Yes                  B. No 
If yes, which of the following is the most common? 
A. Perfectly resolved and both sides were satisfied. 
B. Resolved based on sacrifice of the hospital’s benefits. 
C. Resolved based on sacrifice of the patient’s benefits. 
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D. Not resolved. The conflict has been upgraded or further mediation is needed. 
When a medical dispute occurs, which action will the hospital take commonly? 
A. Negotiate with the patient to carry out mediation. 
B. Ask a third party rather than a law department to carry out mediation or arbitration. 
C. Ask the court to carry out mediation or judgment. 
D. Otherwise (please amplify). 
6.2 Survey Answers 
Question Hospital 1 Hospital 2 Hospital 3 Hospital 4 
Q1 A A (B) A (A) A (C) 
Q2 A (A) A (B) A (A) A (A) 
Q3 A A A A 
Q4 A A B C 
Q5 A (B) B (B) A (E) A (D) 
Q6 A (A) A (A) A (A) A (A) 
Q7 B A (A) B B 
Q8 A A A C 
Q9 B A B AC 
Q10 A (A) A (B) A (B) B 
Q11 A (C) A (A) B A (AC) 
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Q12 B (B) A (B) B (B) B (B) 
Q13 A C C A 
Q14 A (ADE) A (ABCDE) A (B) A (ACDE) 
Q15 A (ABC/A) A (ABC/A) A (AC/B) A (ABC/B) 
Table 4: Survey Answers from the 4 Hospitals Linked to Analysis in Chapter 4 
(answers to any additional question fixed to each question are shown in brackets) 
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